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THE MACKAY DOCTRINE: THE GRAND DAME OF
LABOR LAW CLASHES WITH THE CURRENT
STATE OF THE UNION
DEBORAH EBERTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

EASTERN AIRLINES CLOSED its doors at midnight,
January 18, 1991, ending a bitter labor dispute. The
resulting financial difficulties that lasted nearly two years
forced the carrier into bankruptcy.' If the current labormanagement climate continues, Eastern may serve as an
example of the fate awaiting other companies using permanent replacement workers to continue operations during a strike. Other recent examples include the
Greyhound Lines bus strike 2 and the New York Daily
News strike. 3 Greyhound, in a strike plagued by violence,4 has already filed for bankruptcy.5 The crippling
Daily News strike has also moved replaced workers to violence 6 and led to a takeover of the paper by British pubEastern Shutdown Provides Sense of Relief Machinists' Leader Says, 15 BNA DAILY
LAB. REP. Jan. 23, 1991, at A-10.

Baker, Riding Out the Strike, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at DI, col. 2. The
Greyhound strike began in March 1990. Id.
- PermananetReplacement Workers Called Key Issue as Daily News Strike Continues, 210
BNA DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 30, 1990 at A-13. The Daily News Strike began in

October 1990. Id.
4 Samborn, 'Replacements'Spur LaborAction, Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
&Baker, supra note 2, at D1.
6 Cullen, Violence Grows on Picket Lines, The Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1990, at 1.
Newsstands that have tried to sell the paper have been burned down.
Men wielding baseball bats have attacked delivery trucks driven by
replacements brought in by management. A vendor said that two
men who visited his Manhattan stall last week said they would "put
my eyes out" if he sold the News again. So far.., there have been
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lisher Robert Maxwell. These three strikes represent a
disturbing
trend
in labor-management
relations
prompted in part by a weakening labor movement in the
United States: strikes triggering financial disaster in labor
intensive, competitive industries.
The use of permanent replacement workers to continue
operations during a strike is controversial. Labor advocates blame use of replacements for the erosion of the
strike's power as an economic bargaining tool." Industry
proponents maintain that replacements simply balance
power between the economic tools utilized by both sides
during labor disputes. 9 Business leaders further argue
that disallowing permanent replacements eliminates the
employer's most significant economic weapon for protecting his business interests during a strike.' 0 The issue of
whether permanent replacements should be used during a
strike "captures the essence of labor-management relations" by pitting a "worker's right to strike over economic
disputes without being fired, against a company's right to
continue operating by hiring permanent replacements." II
The National Labor Relations Act' 2 (NLRA) governs
nearly 100 reported acts of violence and intimidation and more than
20 arrests.
Id.
, Experts Differ on How Daily News Strike Will Affect Debate on Replacement Workers, 86
BNA DAILY LaB. REP. May 3, 1991, at C-1.
8 See Kilborn, The Daily News Strike Tests the Will of Weakened Labor, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1991, at 1, col. 1. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3936: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101 st
Congs., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (Statement of Hon. William Clay, House of Representatives and Chairman of the Comm. on Education
and Labor).
9 Schatzki, The Employer's UnilateralAct - A Per Se Violation - Sometimes, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 470, 487-88 (1966).
10 Comment, Replacing MacKay: StrikebreakingActs and Other Assaults on the Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 861, 861 (1984).
1 Samborn, supra note 4, at 28.
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
There are four major federal labor acts: the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988);
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141144, 151-167, 171, 187 (1988); The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-153, 158-160, 164, 187 (1988); and
the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-157 (1988) which governs the
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the establishment of labor bargaining units and the methods by which these units can negotiate with their employers.13 Historically, one of the labor's stronger negotiating
tools was the unequivocal right to strike,14 found in section 7 of the NLRA, coupled with limitations upon employers' responses in section 8.15 The statute's language
on its face appears to forbid any attempt by an employer
to replace an employee who chooses to participate in a
6
strike.'
The right to strike is a fundamental labor law principle;
yet, despite its theoretical importance, it was arguably undermined somewhat shortly after its statutory guarantee.
labor relations for railroads and airlines. Interestingly, NLRA decisions are often
analogized to the RLA. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n
of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432 (1989) ("We have observed in the past
that carefully drawn analogies from the federal common labor law developed
under the NLRA may be helpful in deciding cases under the RLA .... [lI]ower
courts that have examined the reinstatement rights of strikers under the RLA have
turned to NLRA precedents for guidance.") For a general discussion of the relationship between the RLA and the NLRA see Arouca & Perrit, TransportationLabor
Regulation: Is the Railway LaborAct or the National Labor Relations Act the Better Statutoy
Vehicle?, 1985 LAB. LJ. 145.
1329 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158 (1988).
14 SeeJ. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW
AND PRACTCE (1988).
The motive that ultimately persuades employers to accept union
contract proposals is the fear of the consequences of a strike. What

persuades the union to make compromise proposals is the potential
harm to the union and its members that may accrue from a strike.
Union members who strike are risking their jobs and are necessarily
giving up their pay during the period of the strike. The system
works as well as it does because the consequences of failing to reach
agreement are potentially harmful to both sides.
Id. at 138.
15 29 U.S.C. § 157. This section states in pertinent part that "[e]mployees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ......
This Act further provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157; ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or

tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization....
Id. § 158(a)(1), (3).
16See id.
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In 1938, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. , 17 an innocuous case on its face' 8 that
quite possibly marked the beginning of the end of the
strike's effectiveness as a bargaining tool.'" The MacKay
holding allows strike-riddled organizations to hire permanent replacement workers to take the place of striking
workers. 20 Upon termination of the strike, the replacement workers do not have to be fired in order to restore
striking workers to their old jobs.2 '
The MacKay doctrine is entrenched in American labor
law despite over fifty years of criticism and calls to overturn it.22 Until recently, industry, granting great deference to labor unions, limited the use of replacement
workers during strikes.23 The prevailing trend, however,
suggests that this deference is eroding, if not completely
forgotten.24 Widespread disagreement exists as to when
and why use of permanent replacements went from being
unusual to being the norm. Some observers believe that
President Reagan's harsh treatment of the air traffic controllers' strike that sent a clear signal that striking unions
should not look to the government for sympathy or support caused the change. 5 Others believe it was simply a
,' 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
8 Weinstein, Will You be a Union Man or Will You be a Scab?, CAL. LAw., Apr.,
1987, at 44, 47. "Ironically, when the MacKay decision was handed down by a
unanimous Supreme Court... it was not perceived by everyone as a great victory
for management." Id. at 46.
- See generally J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AsSUMPrIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw
(1983).
20 MacKay, 304 U.S. at 345.
21 Id. at 345-46.
22 Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 393 (1984). "[Flew rules of American labor
law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike
replacements." Id.
25 Samborn, supra note 4, at 28.
24 Id. Commentators argue over the exact date and the cause of this increased
use of permanent replacement workers, but they generally agree that the last decade witnessed a dramatic rise in their use by companies being struck. Id.
25 Id. In 1981, Present Reagan fired the striking members of the Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). Many believe firing the striking
controllers, and hiring permanent replacements for them, led to the demise of
PATCO. Id. See also Castro, Labor Draws an Empty Gun, TIME, Mar. 26, 1990, at 56,
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combination of intense international competition and unreasonable labor contracts which combined to make
American companies less competitive at home and
abroad.26
Any solution to the dilemma of whether business
should continue to use permanent replacements, if there
is one, must come from Congress, because the Supreme
Court shows no inclination toward overturning its classic
dicta.2 7 The stage is set for a dramatic fight between business and labor on the issue, as evidenced by recent strikes
that have ended in financial disaster for both the company, 28 and the striking unions;2 a recent Supreme Court
decision further expanding MacKay;30 and pending legislation.3 ' In many business and labor leaders' minds, the
57. " 'Other employers, public and private, interpreted this as a declaration of
open season on unions and went all-out to block, weaken or be rid of them,' says
Thomas Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO." Id.
26 Samborn, supra note 4, at 29. In addition to the intense international competition and unreasonable labor contracts, other factors prevented labor from effectively fighting the use of permanent replacements. For instance, many of the
almost 19 million new jobs created in the 1980's existed in the non-organized
service and small business sector which is traditionally not unionized. Job security
became increasingly more important at the same time large companies such as
TWA, Phelps Dodge, Boise Cascade, International Paper and others "cracked
down hard" on their unions by imposing pay cuts, decreasing benefits and increasing the length of workdays. Castro, supra note 25, at 57. The unions dared
not oppose their employers for fear of harming their members' interests. When
unions did oppose employer's actions, they usually lost. Id.
27 See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MacKay
doctrine as dicta. The Supreme Court most recently extended the MacKay rule in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S.
426 (1989). In TWA, the Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act, by
analogy to the National Labor Relations Act, does not require employers to terminate junior crossover employees after a strike to reinstate senior full-term strikers.
Id.
28 For example, Eastern Airlines dissolved, Greyhound filed bankruptcy and the
Daily News faces bankruptcy or dissolution. See supra notes 1-6 for a further
discussion.
2 Clearly, when the struck companies fail or enter into bankruptcy, the union
members suffer. See, e.g. Cooper, A Career Goes Down in Flames, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27,
1991, at 70 (a lifetime career at Eastern Airlines is destroyed by the airline's failure); Baker, supra note 2, at Dl. (Greyhound strikers face hardships as the strike
continues).
so TWA, 489 U.S. at 426.

Ward, Replacement of Strikers Dulls Labor's Top Weapon, The Courier-Journal,
Apr. 16, 1990, § B, at 18. The House and Senate have before them bills S. 55 and
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use of replacement workers and crossovers 32 in the event
of a strike will be the key labor issue in the coming
decade. 3
II.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

MAcKAY

DOCTRINE

Few decisions in labor law have generated as much controversy as the MacKay decision.34 Since its inception, the
MacKay doctrine has been fraught with criticism. At its
most simplistic, the rule is said to deprive the labor union
of the power of its most drastic labor tool-the strike.35
At its most complex, unions allege that management is using replacement workers to oust unions, end negotiations,
and win decertification. 6
The great irony of MacKay is that the court did not need
to address whether employers can hire permanent
replacements in the event of a strike to settle the issue
directly before them.3 7 The employer in MacKay used
H.R. 5, sponsored respectively by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and
Representative Bill Clay (D-Mo.), which would ban both the hiring of permanent
replacements during a strike and discrimination against returning workers when
the strike is finished. See infra notes 175-188 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the pending legislation.
32 A crossover is a term the Supreme Court used to describe the workers who
struck, but who later returned to work before the strike officially ended and those
who decided not to strike in the first place. See TWA, 489 U.S. at 430.
- Miller, Next Year's Big Labor Issue, INDUSTRY WEEK, July 2, 1990, at 56. "Every
so often, industry and organized labor engage in one of their time-honored, noholds-barred power struggles in Congress.... Now the two sides are marshalling
forces for a new showdown-this one over a labor-instigated proposal that would
prohibit companies from hiring permanent replacements during economic
strikes." Id.
34 Weiler, supra note 22, at 393.
11 Castro, supra note 25, at 56.
As more and more employers move quickly to replace striking workers, some union leaders are beginning to view their biggest weapon,
the refusal to work, as labor suicide ....
The [NLRA] does indeed
grant them [the right to strike]. But while the statute prohibits employers from firing or punishing striking union members, those
same employers can cite a 1938 Supreme Court decision giving
them the right to hire permanent replacements for workers who are
striking for [economic reasons]. Id.
-I See Samborn, supra note 4, at 28.
37 Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, LAB. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1987).
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replacements during its union's economic strike.3 8 At the

strike's end the employer offered permanent employment
to those who had replaced the strikers. Five replacements
decided to stay and thus the employer had to decide

which five strikers would not be reinstated. 39 The em-

ployer chose the five employees most active in the union.
The legality of this discrimination against those five strikers was the issue before the court. 40 The National Labor

Relations Board (NLRB) did not ask the court to address
the right to replace strikers." The court found that MacKay's method of choosing the strikers who would not be
reinstated was discriminatory.4 2
In reaching its decision, however, the court, in dicta,
commented:
[n]or was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking
employees with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although § 13 provides, 'Nothing in this Act shall
be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike, it does not follow that an
employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has
lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound
to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon
the election of the latter to resume their employment, in
order to create places for them.4 3

In these few sentences the Court laid down a labor law
principle with potentially profound effects upon labormanagement relations during a strike. With no more explanation than given in the quoted paragraph, the
Supreme Court set the tone for more than half of a century of labor disputes. Thus, ironically, one of the most
influential labor law doctrines in history is based upon
Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the Public Sector in Ohio, 46
L.J. 639, 643 n.41 (1985). "An economic strike is one that is neither
caused nor prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practice." Id.
39 MacKay, 304 U.S. 333, 339 (1938).
-

OHIO STATE

40

Id.

4

Id.

42
4

Id. at 347.
Id. at 345-46.
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dicta44 and despite its questionable genesis, the rule has
not been overturned.
Since the MacKay decision, the Supreme Court has decided a line of cases both substantiating the replacement
worker rule and limiting it. The result is a strange mixture of cases which forbid assessing a number of lesser
penalties upon the striking union, yet reinforce the employer's right to permanently replace striking workers.
One commentator posits that the law in this area allows
for "killing but not wounding. ' 45 A brief look at the cases
demonstrates this concern.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 46 makes the important distinction between the reinstatement rights of economic
strikers 47 and unfair labor practice strikers. 48 The MacKay doctrine' only applies to economic strikers. 49 Thus,
only economic strikers do not have a right to displace permanent replacements at the end of a strike to get their old
jobs back. Because of the nature of unfair labor strikes,
the rule set forth in Mastro Plastics is different.
The court in Mastro Plastics held that unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to unequivocal reinstatement and
any replacements who took their place can be fired to reinstate them.5 ° Although some critics disagree with the
44 Weiler, supra note 22, at 388-89. "These seemingly causal dicta about the
legality of the most important economic weapon in the employer's arsenal remain
virtually untouched to this day." Id.; see also, Estreicher, supra note 37, at 298.
"The statement about the right to hire permanent replacements is classic obiter
dictum, but the rule announced has survived and flourished for a half-century."
ld.
45j. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 141.
46 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
47 Wilson, supra note 38, at 643.
48

An unfair labor practice strike is a work stoppage protesting an employer's
ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND

unfair labor practice. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 339 (1976).

49 MacKay, 304 U.S. at 344.
"Under the findings the strike was a consequence
of, or in connection with, a current labor dispute... [since] there were pending
negotiations for the execution of a contract touching wages and terms and conditions of employment ... cannot be denied." Id.
Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 278.
In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, petitioners' unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for
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distinction, strikers protesting unfair labor practice arguably merit more protection than strikers who desire to improve their own economic situation. 5 The Mastro Plastics
Court stated that failure to allow a strike protesting an unfair labor practice would "seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act."15 2 The use of such
strong language by the Court suggests heightened importance for unfair labor strikers which helps explains the divergent treatment of economic and unfair labor practice
strikers after replacements.
The issue presented in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc.s
concerned the dispositions of vacation benefits to striking
workers. The employer paid accrued vacation benefits to
replacement workers, returning strikers, and nonstrikers
who had been at work on a certain date. Vacation benefits
were not paid to the strikers. The Court held this was a
violation of Section 8(3) of the NLRA 54 because the employer's conduct would likely discourage participation in
protected activities.55
In its Great Dane analysis, the Court established a test
for balancing an employee's right to strike against the employer's right to protect its business. If an employer's
the orderly strike that occurred here. Under those circumstances,
the striking employees do not lose their status [as employees] and
are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for
them have been made.
Id. See also NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 51 (1972) (unfair labor
strikers are entitled to reinstatement and back pay even if they have been replaced); HardingGlass Indus. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1982) (unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement regardless of whether they
have been replaced); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir.
1953) (unfair labor strikers entitled to reinstatement even if replacement workers
must be fired).
-,Janes, The Illusion of Permanencyfor MacKay Doctrine Replacement Workers, 54
TEx. L. REv. 126, 127 (1975).

52Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 278.
- 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) reads, in pertinent part, "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization .. " Id.
- Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 32.
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conduct is "inherently destructive" to vital employee
rights then the employer must establish a "legitimate and
substantial business justification" for the conduct.5 6 If the
employer proves such a justification and the effect upon
employee rights is "comparatively slight," the NLRB must
show the employer to be anti-union to find a Section 8(3)
violation.
The Supreme Court reiterated its Great Dane holding in
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.58 when it held that an employer must show a "legitimate and substantial business
justification" for refusal to reinstate strikers or else face
liability for violation of an unfair labor practice.5 9 The
Court once again recognized the distinction between the
illegal discharge of employees for strike activities and the
legal replacement of strikers to continue operations. The
court, however, reaffirmed MacKay when it further held
that hiring permanent replacements to continue business
operations satisfied a legitimate and substantial business
justification.6 °
Building upon the foundations set forth in Great Dane
and Fleetwood Trailers, the Seventh Circuit in Laidlaw Corp.
v. NLRB 6 1 decided that if permanent replacements leave
after the strike, the employer must attempt to rehire strikers. 62 Thus, the striking employee's status as replaced
rather than discharged is important. The Seventh Circuit
held that an employer cannot refuse to reinstate the strikers based on the "legitimate and substantial business jus0

57

Id. at 34.

Id.
389 U.S. 375 (1967).

51Id. at 378. "If, after conclusion of the strike, the employer refuses to reinstate
striking employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their
rights to organize and to strike .... [then] it is an unfair labor practice to interfere
with the exercise of these rights." Id,
- Id. at 379. "Insome situations, 'legitimate and substantial business justifications' for refusing to reinstate employees who engaged in an economic strike have
been recognized. One is when the jobs claimed by the strikers are occupied by
workers hired as permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue
operations." Id.
6, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
62 Id. at 105.
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tification" standard adopted from Fleetwood Trailers.6 3 As a
result, the use of permanent replacements does not remove all of a striker's claims to his former job.64 If a
striker's position has not been filled at the end of a strike
he can apply for that job, and if the employer receives an
unconditional request for reemployment, 65 he must employ the striker if a vacancy remains. 66 If the striker has
been replaced, he must be put on a preferential hiring list
and given priority when a future opening occurs.6 7
Included within the realm of forbidden activities for the
employer lies the granting of "super-seniority" status or
any similar action which could cause long-lasting rifts between returning strikers and replacements according to
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.68 In Erie Resistor, the employer
awarded twenty years of "super-seniority" to new hires
and crossovers. 69 The Supreme Court distinguished Mac63

Id

- J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 140; Wilson, supra note 38, at

647. "In summary, under the NLRA as it has been construed by the NLRB and the
courts, the economic striker is guaranteed her employee status, although not necessarily her job." Id.
83 In order to be eligible for reinstatement rights, economic strikers who have
not been replaced must either personally, or through their union, make a specific,
unconditional application for reinstatement. See Swearington Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 568 F.2d 458, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1978); Bryan Infants Wear Co., 235 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) 305, 1306 (1978); Michael Muldoon Elder, 227 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 46
(1976).
6
Wilson, supra note 38, at 645.
67 Id. at 646. When reinstatement occurs, it must be with all benefits and seniority that the employee possessed before the strike. See Globe Molded Plastics
Co., 204 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 041 (1973). The former economic striker must receive the equivalent pay and benefits he received before the strike began. See
Northwest Oyster Farms, Inc., 173 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 72, 876 (1968). Furthermore, the striker has the right to be reinstated for any position he is qualified for,
not just the exact one he held before the strike. See Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v.
NLRB, 455 F.2d 163, 168 n.7 (8th Cir. 1972). Moreover, there is no time limit
placed upon the duration of reinstatement rights, unless limited by negotiations
between the employer and the union and set forth in a strike agreement. See
Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 34 (1973); United Aircraft
Corp., 192 NLRB 382 Dec. (CCH) 1971), enforced in part sub nom. International
Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
- 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
- Id. at 223.

[T]he company informed the union that it had decided to award 20
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Kay and held that this practice constituted an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA. According to the Court,
"super-seniority by its very terms operates to discriminate
between strikers and non-strikers, both during and after a
strike, and its destructive impact 70upon the strike and
union activity cannot be doubted.
Erie Resistor argued that awarding super-seniority was
a legitimate business purpose protected as a corollary of
MacKay's right of replacement, 7 ' because it was necessary
to attract replacement workers 72 to keep their operations
running. 73 The court rejected this alleged "legitimate
business purpose" for implementing the practice, 74 stating that just because the "employer's interest must be
deemed to outweigh the damage to concerted activities
caused by permanently replacing strikers does not mean it
also outweighs the far greater encroachment resulting
from super-seniority in addition to permanent replacement."175 The Court simply could not justify the emyears' additional seniority both to replacements and to strikers who
returned to work, which would be available only for credit against
future layoffs and which could not be used for other employee benefits based on years of service.
Id. The strikers voted to continue despite this threat from Erie Resistor's management. Id.
The Court reached its decision in part based upon the findings of
70 Id. at 231.
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which held that Erie Resistor's plan
had the following characteristics: (1) super-seniority affects the tenure of all strikers whereas MacKay, properly applied, only affects those strikers who are actually
replaced; (2) an award of super-seniority operates to the detriment of those who
participated in the strike as against those who did not participate; (3) offering
super-seniority in effect offers an inducement to abandon the strike; (4) giving
super-seniority benefits to striking union employees in addition to new replacement employees deals a crippling blow to the strike effort by diluting senior employee status and improving junior employee status; and, (5) unlike the
replacement issue in MacKay which is no longer an issue after the strike ends,
granting super-seniority renders future bargaining very difficult for future union
representatives. Id. at 230-31.
71 Id. at 225.
72 Id. at 225-26.
73 Id. at 231.
74 Id. at 228. "Conduct which on its face appears to serve legitimate business
ends ... is wholly impeached by the showing of an intent to encroach upon protected rights." Id.
75 Id. at 232.
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ployer's conduct in this case.
In Belknap v. Hale,76 the court added a new twist to the
state of the law. The Court upheld the right of permanent
replacement workers to sue the employer in state court
for breach of contract if they are fired at the conclusion of
a strike. 7 7 The Court, in so holding, "suggested that employers should make only conditional offers to potential
replacements, subject to possible NLRB orders or union
contract settlements. 78 1 Allowing the replacements to sue
for state breach of contract claims raises the stakes for the
employers deciding whether to hire permanent replacements. According to one commentator, the "ruling
makes the decision to employ permanent replacements an
act of great significance ' 79 due to the inevitably strained
relationship the returning strikers will have with the remaining replacements," °

Belknap also demonstrates that replacements supposedly hired on a "permanent" basis are realistically no
more assured of permanency than the strikers they are replacing."' If the strike is transformed from an economic
463 U.S. 491 (1983).
Id. at 499-500. The Court was "unpersuaded" by Belknap's arguments that
permitting suits of this type would:
upset the delicate balance of forces established by the federal
law.... It is true that the federal law permits, but does not require,
the employer to hire replacements during the strike, replacements
that it need not discharge in order to reinstate strikers if it hires the
replacements on a 'permanent' basis within the meaning of the federal labor law. But when an employer attempts to exercise this very
privilege by promising the replacements that they will not be discharged to make room for returning strikers, it surely does not follow that the employer's otherwise valid promises of permanent
employment are nullified by federal law and its otherwise actionable
misrepresentations may not be pursued.
76

77

Id.

Weiler, supra note 22, at 392 n.138.
GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 141.
- Id. "The hiring of permanent replacements ... makes eventual settlement
with the union problematic since a fundamental union demand in any settlement
is the reinstatement of the strikers. The issue of what to do with the replacements
is likely to become a stumbling block inhibiting successful completion of the negotiations." Id.
S Janes, supra note 51, at 126. "An examination of [permanent replacements']
78
7

J.
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strike into an unfair labor strike, the permanent replacement becomes a temporary one. 8 2 In addition, the striking union usually demands reinstatement of all striking
workers as part of a settlement agreement to end the
strike. 83 In either of these situations, the permanent replacement is only protected to the extent he84 or she could
claim a state cause of action under Belknap.
The most recent union setback in this area occurred in
1989. In Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants, 5 the airline vowed to hire permanent
replacements for its striking flight attendants, to continue
employing flight attendants who chose not to strike, and
to rehire any flight attendants who abandoned the
strike.8 6 TWA warned the strikers that any available job or
domicile vacancies created by the strike would be filled according to the seniority bidding system8 7 by attendants
rights reveals that permanency is illusory and that replacements are potentially
unwitting victims of the federal, union-oriented labor scheme." Id.
82 See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972) (if a strike continues
after the employer commits unfair labor practices, the original economic strike
becomes an unfair labor practice strike).
83 J.GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 141.

463 U.S. at 502-03. Belknap argued that the balance of power shifts if an
otherwise permanent replacement offer is really nonpermanent because the
Board could force reinstatement of strikers or could bargain with their union to
reinstate strikers. The Court responded:
An employment contract with a replacement promising permanent
employment, subject only to settlement with its employees' union
and to a Board unfair labor practice order directing reinstatement of
strikers, would not in itself render the replacement a temporary employee subject to a displacement by a striker over the employer's
objection during or at the end of what is proved to be a purely economic strike.
Id.
85489 U.S. 426 (1989).
Id. at 429.
87 Id. An important feature of the existing collective bargaining agreement between TWA and the union was an intricate seniority bidding system which,
although not disputed at the time, would become an issue later in the case. The
bidding system ensured that the flight attendants with the most seniority were
given preferential treatment with respect to job assignments, flight schedules and
domiciles and it also protected flight attendants from the periodic furloughs common to the industry. For example, Los Angeles is a popular domicile. When ajob
vacancy appears there, the most senior qualified flight attendant who bids on it
gets the position. Furthermore, if a job reduction occurs in Los Angeles, a fur-
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who were working at the time and that such assignments
would remain effective after the strike's end.
As a result of TWA's policy, senior strikers who did not
come back to work until the dispute was settled could not
displace permanent replacements or junior attendants
who chose not to strike.8 8 The full-term strikers returned
to work with the same amount of seniority they had before
the strike began.8 9 The employees that were senior
before the strike, however, lost their positions to junior
employees who chose not to strike or who abandoned the
strike before it ended 9 0
Basing its decision on the right not to strike found in
both the RLA and the NLRA, the Court refused the
union's request to expand Erie Resistor to assuage fear of a
"cleavage" between the full-term strikers and the replacements and crossovers after the strike ended. 9 ' One commentator states that TWA
loughed flight attendant can either displace the most junior attendant of equal
rank in the most junior attendant of lower rank in the same domicile. Thus, the
seniority bidding system was an important feature of the collective bargaining
agreements and was critical to the structure of the flight attendant's workplace.
Id. at 430.
- Id. TWA used the bidding system to create two incentives. First, senior flight
attendants were motivated to either not strike or to return to work before the
strike ended to keep their domicile or job assignment. Second, junior attendants
were tempted to avoid the strike in order to scoop up lucrative assignments that
would otherwise be unavailable to them. Id.
89 Id. "[O]nce reinstated, the seniority of full-term strikers is in no way affected
by their decision to strike." Id. at 435. The court gives several examples:
[S]hould any vacancies develop in desirable job assignments or
domiciles, reinstated full-term strikers who have bid on those vacancies will maintain their priority over junior flight attendants, whether
they are new hires, crossovers, or full-term strikers. In the same
vein, periodic bids on job scheduling will find senior reinstated fullterm strikers maintaining their priority over all their junior
colleagues.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. The majority recognized that allowing replacements and crossovers to
remain after the strike did leave many full-term strikers without work. The Court,
however, did not believe that the employees who chose not to strike should have
been punished. The Court stated: "[wie see no reason why those employees who
chose not to gamble on the success of the strike should suffer the consequences
when the gamble proves unsuccessful." Id. at 438.
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can be viewed as either a movement by the Supreme Court
toward the preservation of individual rights or as a shift in
the balance of power between employers and labor unions .... [T]he crossover policy can have a profound effect
by increasing the employer's economic tools at the expense of unions [although] the extent to which the balance
of power shifts will vary among situations.92
TWA continued the Court's trend, beginning with MacKay,
toward decreasing the power of the strike as an effective
and powerful labor tool. The trend encourages junior
employees to remain on the job in order to garner
favorable job slots while senior employees who leave
those lucrative positions when they opt to strike are
punished.
The decisions following MacKay are diverse and lack a
common theme. On the one hand, a series of cases including Mastro Plastics, Great Dane, and Laidlaw strengthen
labor's position by attempting to remedy the imbalance of
power allegedly tilted in favor of the employer in MacKay.
On the other hand, cases such as Belknap, TWA, and Fleetwood Trailers expand the classic case further. The
Supreme Court has not successfully articulated a demonstrable difference between allowing strikers to be replaced
in order to continue operations as a viable economic
-Comment, Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants: Introducing a New Economic Weapon in the Labor Law Arena, 38 KANSAS L. REV. 1061,
1082-83 (1990). The author goes on to list considerations which will determine
the strength of the crossover policy as a labor tool including:
(1) What is the relationship between the employer and the employees? Are they likely to strike or will their differences be resolved
through negotiation?; (2) How effective have prior negotiations
been? Has the union negotiated a favorable [collective bargaining
agreement]?; (3) How large is the plant? Can the employer induce
enough employees to return and continue operations in an economic climate where replacements are hard to find?; (4) What degree of expertise do the striking employees have? Can the employer
find replacements with the same expertise?.. .and (5) What kind of
relationship does the union have with its members? Do the members have a strong sense of loyalty? Does the union have the resources to help its members survive a strike?
Id. at 1083. See also R. GORMAN, supra note 48, at 342. The same factors can be
utilized to determine the employer's ability to hire MacKay replacements. Id.
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weapon and the granting of super-seniority forbidden in
Erie Resistor 93 or the denial of vacation benefits in Great
Dane. Therefore, such replacement arguably "should not
warrant special exemption from the carefully articulated
Section 8(a)(3) analysis."94
III.

CRITICISM OF THE MACKAY DOCTRINE

MacKay is widely criticized on many grounds. Ostensibly, the decision simply upholds the employer's right to
maintain operations during a strike.9 5 The underlying assumption is "that without the ability to permanently replace strikers, employers will be unable to operate during
strikes." '9

6

According to legal commentators, this so-

called business justification rationale may not be necessary or sound for several reasons. 9 7 First, hiring replacements is not the only weapon in the employer's arsenal. 98
Second, the fact that replacements have only been used in
the recent past 99 suggests that they are unnecessary to
continue business operations during a strike. Third, the
courts have never demanded empirical proof to substanti,,J. ATLESON,

supra note 19, at 26.
The Court's conclusion [in Erie Resistor] is dubious only in its attempt
to distinguish MacKay, because that doctrine also threatens future
union cohesion by creating a work force that may consist of reinstated strikers as well as strike replacements. It would be difficult to
generalize any empirically based rationale that one situation is necessarily more damaging to future union effectiveness than the other.

Id.
Gillepsie, The MacKay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV.
782, 784 (1972).
95 J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 139.
96 Id.
97 Gillespie, supra note 94, at 788. "MacKay owes its firm entrenchment in the
law to the lack of any clear disproof of its assumption that employers must hire
permanent replacements to protect and continue their business." Id. See also
Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-'"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 383-85 (1969). "The unspoken premises of
the MacKay doctrine appear to be ... the factual assumption that the employer is
unable to continue his business during the strike without the opportunity to offer
replacements permanent employment (a rather significant and unsubstantiated
factual assumption to go unarticulated)." Id.
98 Gillespie, supra note 94, at 790-91.
Samborn, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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ate the assumption that replacements are necessary to
continue operations during a strike or to avoid serious
economicconsequences. 00
MacKay has other weaknesses. The most glaring deficiency is the opinion's apparent contradiction of the plain
meaning of the NLRA. Another problem is the bargaining advantage proffered to employers as a result of their
ability to maintain operations during a strike. Finally, a
union's status when the strike ends is jeopardized by replacing striking union members with replacement workers
who are prone to be anti-union. Combined, all of these
factors demonstrate MacKay's alleged threat to organized
labor in this country.
Since an employer has many options available with
which to fight a strike without resorting to hiring permanent replacements,' 0 ' MacKay's underlying assumption
that replacements are necessary for an employer's survival
is questionable. One possibility is to use non-strikers, returning strikers, and managerial and supervisory personnel to supplant striking workers.' 0 2 Work normally done
by the strikers may also be subcontracted to outside workers. 0 3 To preserve the enterprise without continuing operations, the employer can use strike insurance,
J. ATLESON, supra note 19, at 25.
The Court's ruling [in MacKay], however, does not turn on evidence
that the employer required replacements, permanent or temporary,
because no showing of economic necessity was required.... In addition, employers need not prove that the business could not continue
with temporary (as opposed to permanent) replacements. Employers may hire permanent replacements-and thereby remove the
strikers, and often the union, from the scene-even if other alternatives exist to avoid serious economic dislocation.
Id. (emphasis added).
,o, Gillespie, supra note 94, at 790. "Employers commonly have a number of
alternative weapons available that allow them to continue operations during
strikes without resorting to permanent replacements." Id.
102 Id. at 790. See also C. PERRY, A. KRAMER & T. SCHNEIDER, OPERATING DURING
STRIKES 54 (Labor Relations & Public Policy Series No. 23, 1982); Unkovic &
Harty, Management's Legal Problems in Continuing Plant Operations During an Economic
Strike under Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DICK. L. REV. 63, 66 (1962).
log Gillespie, supra note 94, at 790; see also, Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d
397 (9th Cir. 1963).
'
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arbitration, or can institute a lock-out.'04 Any one or a
combination of these options may serve the same business
purpose as hiring permanent replacements without the
05
detrimental effect on the striking union members.'
Courts have historically upheld an employee's right to
use replacement workers without demanding any proof
that the practice is essential to protect the enterprise from
unreasonable harm stemming from the strike. The only
known empirical study on the subject comes from the
Wharton School of Business. The Wharton Study surveyed fifteen companies that operated successfully during
strikes, 0 6 and found several factors that these companies
had in common. First, they primarily relied upon salaried
workers to take up the slack of the strikers.1 0 7 Second, the
,04 Gillespie, supra note 94, at 790-91.
105 Id. at 791. The effectiveness of these alternatives will depend upon such
factors as: the skill level of the work force, the size of the striking group, the
strength of the union organization, the size of the union strike funds, the length of
the strike, the seasonal or nonseasonal nature of the work, the community attitude
toward organized labor, the tightness of the labor market, the presence of competitors, the use of industry-wide bargaining, the degree of automation in the
business, the size of the plant, and the wealth of the business being struck. Id. at
791-94.
0 C. PERRY, supra note 102, at 3.
[N]o body of data on the extent and incidence of plant operation
exists that would permit identification of all the firms that have attempted to operate during strikes. Thus the selection of a set of
firms for intensive study had to be made on the basis of public information and knowledge. Fifteen companies known to have operated
a major production facility during a strike were selected for study
based on two criteria: (1) frequency of operation, and (2) feasibility
of operation. ...
....... In each of the companies, interviews were conducted with
management personnel through combination of informal discussion
and questioning based on a detailed interview guide. The interviews
were augmented in most cases by review of relevant formal policies
and procedures and, when available, strike manuals, plans, logs, and
other documents relating to specific operating experiences.
ld.
107 Id. at 54. "The most readily available supply of potential replacement workers willing to cross a picket line ... is a company's own managerial and supervisory employees. This pool of labor generally is the preferred and primary source
of replacement labor among firms that operate during strikes." Id.
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companies limited their use of outside replacements.'
Finally, the companies purposefully avoided recruiting
permanent replacements. 0 9 Furthermore, these companies did not wish to oust their unions, but rather wanted
t0
to settle with them."
The findings help support the conclusion that the broad
scope of the legal rule is not empirically justified."' Indeed, absent a study that proves employers need permanent replacements to continue operations during a strike,
"there appears to be little justification for the rule that an
employer subjected to an economic strike may employ
permanent replacements and thereby rid himself of his
striking employees and, of course, the union." ' "t 2 Thus,
"[slince only permanent replacements have an anti-union
effect, the MacKay rule could be justified only if permanent replacements serve a business purpose which could
not be served by temporary replacements." ' "t 3
Perhaps the strongest, and the most basic, criticism of
MacKay is its seeming incompatibility with the language of
the NLRA itself.' '4 The "unmistakable intent" of the
NLRA is that an employer may never retaliate against a
striking employee by firing him.' '5 Despite the seemingly
-o8
Id. at 63. "The hiring of replacements for bargaining-unit employees ...

was not an integral element in the operating plans of the firms studied." Id.
-9 Id. at 64. About one-half of the companies studied "reported some recent
effort to replace striking workers .... Most of those firms, however, consciously
avoided the use of permanent replacements whether by explicitly stating that they
were hiring only temporary replacements or by being silent on the subject of
whether replacements were temporary or permanent." Id.
Id. at 68.
Weiler, supra note 22, at 391 n.132.
112

Schatzki, supra note 98, at 385.

11.,Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE LJ. 630, 636 (1966).
'" Schatzki, supra note 97, at 385; see J. ATLESON, supra note 19, at 24; Getman,
The Protection of Economic Pressureby Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 1195, 1204 (1967).
"1 Wieler, supra note 22, at 389. Note, however, that the legislative history surrounding the NLRA does not support this view. See Comment, supra note 10, at
881-82 ("Nowhere can a report or comment be found expressing this view of the
regulatory scheme .... The risk-free economic strike theory is contrary to this
fundamental objective of the Act [accepting the consequences of a decision to
strike] and cannot withstand scrutiny.")
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express meaning of the NLRA, MacKay allows the hiring
of permanent replacements during a strike which, practically speaking, is tantamount to firing a striking employee.
The only difference is the subjective nature of the employer's decision; this technical distinction is cold comfort
to the average rank-and-file worker who will not understand or care about the legal nuances when faced with
unemployment. "16
Moreover, neither the NLRB nor the courts attempt to
determine what the subjective motivation of the employer
is when he hires replacements." 7 The NLRB instead has
formulated a mechanical test to decide whether an employer has hired a legal replacement or has illegally discharged a striker." 8 An employer cannot flagrantly single
out for replacement an employee known to be active in
union activities; however, an employer can permanently
replace any striking employee so long as the official action
is not designed to deter old employees from returning to
work after a strike." 9 Unfortunately, there is no method
by which the Board could realistically ascertain an employer's hidden motives, assuming they exist. 20 At the
116

Id; see also Samborn, supra note 4, at 29.
GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 140.

"17

J.

118

Id.

Unless it can be demonstrated that the employer has singled out for
replacement those whom he knows to be active union members, he
is permitted to lay off permanently any striking employees, as long
as they are not notified that they are replaced or treated as having
been replaced before new employees are hired. Employees are improperly discharged if before replacements are hired, official action
is taken to indicate that the old employees may not return to work
after the strike. This test ... is related only occasionally to the employer's reasons for acting. It is more likely to indicate whether the
employer had competent counsel.
Id.; see also J. ATESON, supra note 19, at 27. "The harm to the strikers is the same,
whatever the intent of securing replacements, and ... [slo long as the employer
does not selectively replace employees on the basis of union leadership or strike
militancy, for instance, the theoretical violation vanishes given the difficulty of
proof of motive." Id.
119J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 140. This test has been approved by the courts. See, e.g., Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 133 (lst
Cir. 1961).
1 o J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN supra note 14. "[A]n inquiry into the employer's
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very least, the rule devised by the Board clarifies what the
employer can and cannot do and prohibits blatant at2
tempts to punish protected activity.1 '
Yet another complaint levelled against MacKay is its effect upon the negotiation process between the employer
and the bargaining unit on strike. Being able to continue
operations during a strike will likely result in a bargaining
agreement favoring the employer. 22 Thus, hiring permanent replacements puts the collective bargaining process
itself in doubt since the employer can avoid the pressure
exerted by the union through its strike.' 2 3 But once strikers have returned to work, they have the knowledge that
ground lost at this juncture may be made up at another
time. 24 The replacements do not share
this viewpoint
25
anti-union.
be
probably
will
since they
Finally, MacKay profoundly affects the status of a union
following a strike. Permanent replacements have full voting rights under the NLRA in any decertification process,
but the strikers' can only vote up to twelve months past
the beginning of a strike.' 2 6 Therefore, the MacKay decision places the union in danger of decertification, since
replacements are generally anti-union. 27 One bright spot
in the replacement's effect on the union's stability came in
a recent 5-4 Supreme Court decision which held that employers cannot assume replacements oppose the union for
the purpose of removing the union.' 2 8 The Court held
that employers cannot break off negotiations with the
striking union just because a majority of their workers are
now replacements and the replacement workers are asstate of mind in such situations [when hiring replacements] would be difficult and
the probable results equivocal." Id. at 140.
121 Id.
122 Weiler, supra note 22, at 390.
124 Id.
24

Id.

Id.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3)
(1988). These sections are quoted in note 3, supra.
127 Weiler, supra note 22, at 390.
128 NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
125
126
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sumed to be opposed to the union.' 2 9 This decision
makes it more difficult for employers to use replacements
30
as a tool for eliminating the union.
One final, more indirect, criticism of MacKay relates to
the diverse treatment of economic and unfair labor strikers. Unfair labor strikers must be reinstated regardless of
whether replacements have taken their place.' 3' This dichotomy causes many practical difficulties for employers
and strikers. For example, when the decision is made to
hire replacements, the employer must be extremely cautious in the manner and timing of his decision to announce the hiring of permanent replacements.
Otherwise, the employer's actions will convert the
strike. 13 2 The Belknap decision has further complicated
this issue by allowing fired permanent replacements to
33
bring common law suits challenging their dismissal.1
The dissimilar treatment of economic and unfair labor
strikers produces anxiety on the part of both employer
and striker because neither will know where it legally
stands, possibly until the middle or end of a strike.' 4 In a
strike caused by multiple factors, if an unfair labor practice had any part in prompting the strike, the strike will be
characterized as an unfair labor strike.' 3 5 Furthermore, an
economic strike can become an unfair labor strike in midstream if an employer commits unfair labor practices dur129

Id.

1- The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104

HARV. L. REV. 349, 355
(1990). "The Curtin Matheson Court's affirmation of the Board's no-presumption rule is an important victory for labor unions." Id. See also Marcus, Ruling
Makes Unions Busting During Strikes More Difficult, Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1990,
at A5. According to Walter Kamiat, associate counsel for the AFL-CIO, the decision forces companies "to find a reason to believe-beyond simply the fact that
they've replaced the [striking] workers-that the [permanent replacements] do
not want to be unionized.... This makes it somewhat more difficult for employers to wash their hands" of their unions. Id.
i Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
132 Anderson,
"Permanent" Replacements of Strikers after Belknap: The Employer's
Quandary, 18 DICK. L. REV. 321, 321 (1985).
'- Belknap, 463 U.S. at 491.
NLRB v. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1991).
32 See American Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ing the economic strike.'" 6 When the nature of the strike
changes it puts the employer in a dilemma because he
now has to fire all replacements he hired since unfair labor strikers are entitled to unconditional reinstatement.
Thus, striking union members should be treated the same
strike or an unfair labor
whether engaged in an economic
3 7
strike to avoid these problems.1
IV.

DEFENSE OF THE MAcKAY DOCTRINE

As IT STANDS

Not all commentary about MacKay is negative. One line
of thought regards the decision as an essential balancing
of power between labor and management. A rational explanation for the doctrine suggests it:
is based on the concept of balancing economic weapons of
the parties engaged in the collective-bargaining battle. To
allow the union to strike to accomplish its economic ends
and then to prevent the employer from carrying on his
business in any meaningful fashion by outlawing all permanent replacements would place the138balance of power
too heavily in the hands of the union.
Business leaders adamantly contend that MacKay balances
the scales during a strike and does not tip them in their
favor as labor contends. 39 Rather, allowing workers to
Note, supra note 113, at 640.
The existence of this rule [unfair labor strikers are entitled to reinstatement] and the permanent replacement rule for economic strikes
makes it difficult for either party to know its rights when the unions
claim management has committed an unfair labor practice during an
economic strike. The unions would claim that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike, and management would claim it was an economic strike.... Since the definition of an unfair labor practice is an
uncertain matter, and since the NLRB and courts may not decide the
case finally for years after the claimed violation, management and
labor are forced to bargain about the strike settlement without
knowing their precise legal relationship.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
157 Id. "A replacement rule which would apply equally to unfair labor practice
and economic strikes is desirable." Id.
136

,ss Schatzki, supra note 8, at 487-88.
139Weinstein, supra note 18, at 47.

'[The ability to hire replacements] is probably the most critical element,' comments Martin F. Payson, a partner in the White Plains,
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strike and then forbidding the employer from operating
in
40
any fashion would give the union too much power.
Another justification for MacKay stems from the employer's property rights.14 1 Shutting down an employer's
business takes away his right to continue operations. Specifically, "[mianagement has the right to attempt to continue the operation of its business when subjected to an
economic strike. While the MacKay Court did not develop
the origin of this right, it clearly flows from the 'right of
property' guaranteed under both federal and state constitutions."' t4 2 Viewed from this vantage point, the MacKay
43
doctrine does seem "ordinarily quite moral."'1
Business does not necessarily exclude the union's interests from consideration when deciding to continue operations during a strike. Despite labor's accusations to the
contrary, management does not always desire to "bust"
the union when it decides to hire permanent replacements. 44 Factors such as competence of the union leadership, competitive conditions in the industry, economic
survival of the company, 45 and overall economic conditions in the country 4 6 affect the employer's decision
whether to replace striking workers. MacKay allows an
New York, office of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, a labor
law firm that represents several Fortune 500 companies. 'Without
the countervailing pressure of the ability to operate, the economic
balance is totally skewed in favor of the union. The employer has
the tool to squeeze back.'"
Schatzki, supra note 97, at 390-91.
Unkovic & Hardy, supra note 102, at 63.
142 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143 Seligman, Strikers' Rights, FORTUNE, Jan. 14, 1990, at
112.
'
Id.; see also Thompson, An Anti- Worker Labor Bill, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1990, at
A10, col. 4. "It is far more truthful to recognize that foreign competition and
consumer demands compel management to take hard bargaining positions.
American management can often no longer afford to shut down their companies'
operations during strikes." Id.
"45 Unkovic & Hardy, supra note 102, at 64-65.
146 Thompson, supra note 144, at A10,
col. 4. In today's economic climate
"[r]ecession looms ...[and] labor is obliged to come to the bargaining table in
times like these ready to consider sacrifices." Id.
140

141
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employer to replace its striking workers when economic
necessity so demands and it is therefore prudent to do so.
Prohibiting replacements per se might also burden the
enterprise with harsh economic consequences. 147 It is
often in society's best interest to have a business continue
operations during a-strike. For example, continued operations would decrease the economic waste inherently
caused by a strike. 1 48 The employer may also face extinction if the strike continues for a long period of time (or
even a short period of time in some instances). 49 Closing
a business permanently is not the best interest of either
the strikers or the business and should be avoided. Finally, injury to society caused by closing certain businesses for any period of time is greater than the injury to
the displaced workers who lose their jobs to
replacements. 50o
Furthermore, use of replacements is usually management's last resort because of problems it spawns. Thus,
their use may not be as widespread or as vindictive as labor contends. Practical considerations keep employers
from replacing their strikers for several reasons.' 5' First,
hiring replacements almost guarantees a violent response
from the union.' 52 Replacements also complicate settlement with the union since every union is going to demand
reinstatement of all strikers at the end of the strike.15 3 In
addition, even if settlement can be reached, relations will
be strained at best between returning strikers and perma54
nent replacements.
Industry is faced with other problems when trying to
Schatzki, supra note 97, at 390.
,I4h at 390-91.

147

Id.
Id. For example, the ongoing Greyhound strike threatens to close many rural routes once serve by the bus line. Many isolated communities are in danger of
losing their only means of transportation as a result. See Castro, supra note 25, at
59.
15,J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 140-4 1.
152 Id. at 141.
149

15

'-

Id.

Id.
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hire permanent replacements to keep their doors open.
One fear is getting inexperienced or inferior replacement
workers.1 55 The quality of the work performed by
replacements may be substandard compared with the
work performed by more experienced workers and, thus,
customers may turn elsewhere for their products. 5 6 Hiring replacements also consumes a substantial amount of
the employer's time and resources. 5 7 Moreover, an employer's workforce is often as valuable to him as the plant
and equipment which they use.'-" Accordingly, given that
employers have such difficulty using replacements and
rely on them only as a last resort (much like the strike is a
last resort for the union), it seems patently unfair to deny
them this bargaining tool to counter powerful and destructive strikes.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND COMPROMISES TO THE
MAcKAY QUANDARY

The most drastic solution to the MacKay quandary proposed by legal commentators goes hand in hand with re-

cently

proposed

legislation:

abandon

MacKay

155Comment, supra note 10, at 883. "The expertise of the employees is often as

crucial to the success of the business as more tangible assets such as plant and
equipment." Id.; see also Unkovic & Harty, supra note 102, at 66. ("Since [striking
employees] includes persons in whom the company has large training and skill
investment, it is very desirable from the company's point of view that these people
return.")
- Castro, supra note 25, at 56.
157 Comment, supra note 10, at 883.
"[T]o actually replace an entire workforce
permanently is an extremely expensive and time-consuming task." Id.
1ss E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 233 (5th Ed. 1976).
A strike denies the company the use of its productive equipment
while overhead costs continue. In a sense that is by no means purely
figurative, part of that production equipment consists of the strikers.
The most advanced techniques of personnel selection, placement,
and training have gone into getting them together and fitting them
into management's grand design that makes the factory work as a
whole a smooth, efficient apparatus of production. They represent
the know-how that the company has developed over the years. The
cost in time, money, and organizing efforts of replacing them at once
would be staggering.

284

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

altogether.1 59 If the basic premise behind the MacKay decision is that employers must have the ability to hire permanent, as opposed to temporary replacements, then, at
the very least, employers should have to prove their ability to survive in the event of a strike absent permanent
replacements. An employer whose business would literally cease to exist should be allowed to hire permanent
replacements. The costs to society are too high in that
type of situation. 161 Simply losing business, however,
should not suffice because that is a purpose of a strike and
does not justify replacing the strikers.16 '
Proving that a business will fail unless permanent
replacements are hired, however, is a difficult task. The
NLRB would have to decide such intangibles as what constitutes a "serious threat" to the business, the availability
of a temporary replacements, and the financial status of
the employer. 62 Further complicating the issue, the
63
NLRB would be evaluating the situation after the strike.
Thus, it is unlikely that any rational attempt can be made
to determine whether an employer will be destroyed
before the end of a strike, which means MacKay must
either be reaffirmed or rejected.' 64
Since it is questionable whether MacKay will be flatly
overturned at this late date, other possible solutions
, Schatzki, supra note 97, at 392. Abandonment may be required because intermediate approaches are impractical.
Id. at 390.
[Slociety has a considerable and legitimate interest in having the
business continue during the strike. First, if the economic waste that
all strikes produce can be avoided by allowing business to continue,
surely there is something to be said for allowing replacements. Secondly, the employer may be threatened with extinction if the strike is
prolonged, and that is a high price for the employer and society to
pay. Moreover, the injury to society caused by destruction of the
business usually will be considerably greater than the injury to society caused by the termination and resulting displacement of the
strikers.
Id. at 390-91.
i, l at 392.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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should be examined which deal with the operation of the
rule rather than the rule itself. The use of temporary
rather than permanent replacements is a suggested compromise.' 65 Another possibility is to institute a balancing
test similar to the one set forth in Great Dane and its progeny.' 6 6 A final solution would be amendment of the
NLRA.

16 7

Use of temporary replacements rather than permanent
ones is a valid option assuming that employers can lure
away workers without offering job security. Many of the
companies in the Wharton study discussed earlier used
only temporary replacements and successfully continued
operations during their strikes.' 68 Moreover, no empirical
studies exist that probe whether temporary replacements
will suffice, which suggests that the possibility of using
provisional replacements should not be completely discounted.' 69 Even sharp critics of MacKay, however, will
admit that under certain circumstances it is necessary to
use permanent, as opposed to temporary, replacements. 70 Even so, these categories of employers do not
justify the broad scope of the rule and the refusal to force
7
employers to rely more upon temporary replacements.'1
If use of temporary replacements is not a realistic option in most circumstances, an alternative solution is to
apply a balancing test similar to the one employed in Great
Dane to limit MacKay.17 2 Great Dane balances the needs of
the employer to maintain operations during a strike with
the employees' rights to strike. If the employer's actions
are "inherently destructive" of the employee's rights, the
Board can find a violation of section 8(3) without the req365
36

Id. at 391.
Gillespie, supra note 94, at 784.

167See infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
option.
366 C. PERRY, supra note 102, at 65.
369 Comment, supra note 10, at 882. Note, however, that this lack of statistical
information does not by itself disprove the MacKay thesis. Id. at n. 161.
170 Schatzki, supra note 97, at 384.

171Id. at 385.
372

Gillespie, supra note 94, at 784.
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uisite antiunion intent.'73 If the employer only slightly
harms the employee's rights and has a "substantial business justification" for the infringement, the Board must
74
find antiunion motivation for an 8(3) violation.
The Great Dane test protects the interest of both business and labor in a reasonable manner, unlike MacKay's
broad, overarching approval of permanent replacements.
Under Great Dane, if the employer faces dire economic circumstances or if the employer is in an industry whose
shutdown would cause great harm to the public, permanent replacements are allowed. On the other hand, the
striking employees are not threatened with unnecessary
replacement on a permanent basis. Their bargaining
power is thus enhanced, but not at the expense of their
employer's business interests.
A final solution to the problems caused by the use of
permanent replacements is a bill currently before the
House and Senate which threatens to overturn MacKay.
The bill, S. 55175 and H.R. 5,1 76 is sponsored in the Senate
by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and in the
,13 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
174 Id.
175 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The bill as it stands before the Senate reads as
follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled,
Section 1. Prevention of Discrimination During and at the Conclusion of Labor Disputes.
Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158(a)) is amended(1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and inserting "; or"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(6) (i) to offer, or to grant, the status of a permanent replacement
employee to an individual for performing bargaining unit work for
the employer during a labor dispute; or
(ii) to otherwise offer, or grant, an individual any employment
preference based on the fact that such individual was employed, or
indicated a willingness to be employed, during a labor dispute over
an individual who(A) was an employee of the employer at the commencement of
the dispute:
(B) has exercised the right to join, to assist, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
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House of Representatives by Representative Bill Clay (DMo.). The bill will amend the NLRA to provide that any
time two or more workers leave the job to protest terms
or conditions of employment, the employer must rehire
them in the same position and any replacements hired in
their place must be fired. 177 The legislation is the "top
priorit[y]" of the Teamsters Union' 7 8 and is supported in
concept, if not in detail, by other unions, 79 including the
Air Line Pilots Association.18 0
The bill presently "ap-

Id.

other mutual aid or protection through the labor organization involved in the dispute; and
(C) is working for, or has unconditionally offered to return to
work for, the employer."
Section 2. Prevention of Discrimination During and at the Conclusion of Railway Labor Disputes.
Paragraph Fourth of section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.
152) is amended(1) by inserting "(a)" after "Fourth."; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) No carrier, or officer or agent of the carrier, shall(1) offer, or grant, the status of a permanent replacement employee to an individual for performing work in a craft of class for the
carrier during a dispute involving the craft or class; or
(2) otherwise offer, or grant, an individual any employment preference based on the fact that such individual was employed, or indicated a willingness to be employed, during a dispute over an
individual who(A) was an employee of the carrier at the commencement of the
dispute;
(B) has exercised the right to join, to organize, to assist in organizing, or to bargain collectively through the labor organization
involved in the dispute; and
(C) is working for, or has unconditionally offered to return to
work for, the carrier."

137 CONG. REC. H.2352 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fawell).
Miller, supra note 33, at 56. "Under terms of the legislation ... any time two
or more workers walk off the job to protest conditions . . . they'd have to be rehired at the same level. Replacements would have to be fired." Id.
,18 The Teamsters will also withhold contributions from any politician who
does not sign as a co-sponsor of the bill. Teamsters Head McCarthy Takes Firm Stand
on Striker Replacement Bill, 236 BNA DAILY LAB. REP., Dec. 7, 1990, at A-7.
179 Id.
I8OSee ALP/A Supports Bill to Prohibit Permanent Hiring of Replacement Workers, 300
AvIATnON DAILY 463 (1990). The airline industry, however, unalterably opposes
the legislation. A study introduced by the Air Transport Association states that
over eighty percent of its members' pilots, flight attendants, and mechanics are
unionized. The study also reveals that the industry has endured seven strikes
176
177
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pears to be sliding through Congress along party lines,
but faces 1 probable veto should it reach the White
House."'

18

Business leaders vehemently oppose the Metzenbaum/
Clay legislation, arguing that it would be a "radical departure from existing law that would shift the delicate balance of power in labor disputes in favor of unions" and
would force businesses to "accede to union demands or
curtail or cease operations.' l8 2 Some smaller, more vulnerable businesses may even "disappear from the horizon" if the bill becomes law.' 8 3 An absolute ban on
permanent replacements would put a "mighty sword in
the hands of labor and dent or destroy the shield of employers." 184 Furthermore, the underlying purpose of the
legislation is simply to increase union power since the bill
would take away the employer's only effective weapon
against union's unreasonable demands.' s5

As such, the

since 1981, and that permanent replacements were utilized in five of those strikes.
The study indicates that, for a major carrier with a strong financial position, a
strike without the use of permanent replacements could bankrupt a carrier in as
little as nine months. Robert Aranson, President of the Air Transport Association, believes the bills would remove an airline's ability to control its labor costs,
thus forcing consumers to take resulting fare increases "on the chin" and returning the country to the 'jet set days." Airline Study Says Carriers, Public Would
Bear Cost of Ban on Striker Replacements, 74 BNA DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 17, 1991, at
A-8. See also Airlines, Unions Girdfor Fight Over Striker Replacement Bill, 134 AVIATION
WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 22, 1991 at 31.
18
White House Confrontation Expected on Striker Replacement Bill, 6 REGIONAL AVIATION WEEKLY Apr. 19, 1991 at 143.
182 Miller, supra note 33, at 56. (comments from the U.S. Chamber of Com-

merce and the National Association of Manufacturers).
,s Lewis, Strike Replacement Bill Debate Heats Up, Boston Globe, May 19, 1991, at
A 93. Marvin Kosters, director of the conservative think-tank, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, states that, "In a more competitive
world, some firms could not withstand economic strikes without permanent
replacements." Id. Furthermore, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce worries that
passage of H.R. 5 will "threaten the very existence of small business." Miller, A
Business-Labor Showdown, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 3, 1991, at 66.
1- Strike Law Strikes Out, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Jan. 21, 1991, at 98.
185 Thompson, supra note 145, at A10; see also House Hearing, supra note 9, at

25 (testimony of Hon. Harris W. Falwell).
[W]hen we say that an employee can't be fired for exercising his
right to strike, which we all would agree should be the law and is the
law: but consider an economic strike, where the issue is whether the
company can afford the union's demands and has, in good faith, a
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bill is "hostile to business, American competitiveness and

the individual worker."'' 8 6 Passing this legislation poses

the danger of dramatically increasing the use of strikes
and putting the union's interest above that of the shareholders, creditors,
customers and the workers
8 7
themselves.1

Labor, on the other hand, lauds the legislation, stating
that the use of permanent replacements "has tilted the
balance in collective bargaining negotiations towards employers, making it easier for them to engage in surface or

sham bargaining... [and to] bust labor unions."'' 8 8 Fur-

thermore, Thomas Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer of the
AFL-CIO, argues that MacKay poisons the entire collective bargaining process and that H.R. 5/S. 55 is necessary
to bring equity back into the system and to save the strike
from extinction.' 8 9 To emphasize their stance and to gar-

ner votes for the upcoming House vote, organized labor
has "launched an intensive, grass roots lobbying campaign" in support of the bill.' 90
Both labor and industry are probably overly apocryphal' 9' in their predictions. H.R. 5 and its Senate counterpart, however, do threaten to realign power between
labor and management. Whether the bill can pass or
withstand an almost guaranteed presidential veto remains
to be seen. The increasing tension between business and
labor on the issue, however, makes it clear that, whatever
the outcome of the vote on H.R. 5, the issue will arise
again in the near future.
different view as to the economic effects if they were to accept the
demands, keeping in mind that they have responsibilities to a board,
to stockholders, to other employees that more and more whom are
now, in this day and age, not union.
Id.
Ja6 Id.
187 Id.
188 Miller, supra note 33, at 56 (comments of Owen Bieber, president of the
United Auto Workers).
189

House Hearing, supra note 9, at 7.

-9 Swoboda, AFL-CIO Begins Campaign on Replacement Workers, Washington Post,
June 21, 1991 at F2.
19, Miller, supra note 183, at 66.
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THE STATE OF THE UNION WITH AND WITHOUT THE
MAcKAY RULE

The full force of the MacKay rule's effect on labor has
only been felt in the last decade. '9 2 Until recently, "most
companies, fearing reprisals, shunned [replacements] like
lepers . . . ."'93 Even steel magnate Andrew Carnegie refused to hire replacements stating "[t]o expect that one
dependent on his daily wage for the necessaries of life will
stand by peaceably, and see a new man employed in his
stead is to expect much ....
Calling upon strange men
should be the last resort."' 94 Mr. Carnegie spoke prophetic words. For just one example, look to the violence
that has plagued the Greyhound strike since its beginning;
much of it has been linked to the companies' aggressive
use of replacement workers. 95
For better or worse, industry's use of replacements is
unwavering and absent specific statutory intervention by
Congress, the MacKay rule will govern the issue.' 96 Two
important factors in the labor management equation thus
remain: 1) the viability of the strike as a labor tool, and 2)
the degree of influence exerted by unions stripped of
their most formidable bargaining weapon. The impact of
these factors on the overall equation depends, of course,
upon which of the parties answers the question. The unions object to a loss of power while business leaders
J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 14, at 140. "Until quite recently the
to permanently replace has not been widely used and striking employees
sometimes been unaware of their legal jeopardy." Id.
Samborn, supra note 4, at 1.
Id. at col. 2.
Id. at 28, col. 1.
One has to look no further than the often violent bus strike by more
than 9,400 members of the Amalgamated Transit Unions to find an
example of the robber baron's concern being realized.... Violence
during the Greyhound strike can be explained as "either coincidence
or strike-related, and it's hard to stretch coincidence so far," says
John W. Noble, Jr., a management attorney.
Id. at 1, col. 2.
- "The Supreme Court in several decisions has reaffirmed Mackay Radio....
Also... Congress has unequivocally ratified the ruling ....It is simply too late in
the day to reopen Mackay Radio." Estreicher, supra note 37, at 289.
192

right
have
,9
11
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maintain that the MacKay doctrine balances the overall
ledger between the sides. Underlying these surface arguments, however, are two broader issues. First, the possibility that the union have lost their effectiveness, and
second, that even if the unions continue to play an important role, perhaps it can or should do so without the
strike.
Membership in labor unions peaked in 1954 when more
than thirty-eight percent of the working force were members. 197 By 1980, an estimated twenty-one percent of the
private work force placed membership in a union 98 and it
is estimated that the number has dropped further since
then. 99 Additionally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that during the 1970's there was an average of 289
strikes per year involving at least 1,000 workers each and
in the last five years that average has dropped to 52.20
One commentator postulates that "[t]hese are bad times
for unions. Union membership is in decline ... and un20
ions continue to lose an increasing number of strikes." '
The union as an organization may be an anachronism
which served its primary purpose many years ago. Certainly the Supreme Court's labor decisions in the past
half-century do not demand this conclusion, but with the
strife plaguing organized labor since the early 1980's, it
seems questionable whether unions in their present form
will exist by MacKay's one hundred year anniversary. If
unions are still necessary, the next question is whether the
strike as an effective labor tool is obsolete. 2
197 Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NRLA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1771 n.4 (1983).

- Id.
- See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SURVEY ON UNION MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS, LAB. REL. Y.B. 298 (1984).

Samborn, supra note 4, at 29, col. 1.
- Schupp, Legal Status of Incentives for Replacement and Striking Workers, LAB. L.
311 (1990).
202 Swoboda, Unions Rethinking Role of the Strike, Wash. Post, Mar. 18,
1990, at
H3, col. 3. "After a decade of watching members permanently lose their jobs to
nonunion 'replacement' workers, the nation's labor leaders are seriously rethinking the role of the strike. More and more, unions are beginning to view the strike
as a weapon of last resort." Id.
200
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Strikes take a hefty toll on both the labor unions and
the businesses they affect. °3 Considering that the
Supreme Court has steadily diminished the strike's power
base over the past fifty-three years, one wonders if the
risks and benefits of striking are still beneficial. Certainly
the stakes are higher now for both parties involved. The
United States is now part of a global business community
haunted by fierce competition, making it questionable
whether a strike can serve its purpose to win concessions
from the employer. 20 4 But just as permanent replacements are not the only arrow in business' quiver, neither
is the strike the last resort left to labor.
Labor unions are using strikes less frequently today
than in the past.2 5 In industries where a ready labor supply is available, it is difficult to strike effectively because of
replacement use.20 6 Moreover, there is a growing trend in
labor to use creative methods of solving labor-management problems.2 0 7 Use of non-traditional strikes,2 0 8 boy-03Weiler, supra note 22, at 388. "Indeed, having employees suffer the economic pain of a lost paycheck is an inherent feature of the strike weapon." Id.; see
also Samborn, supra note 4, at 28. " 'It may appear that management has leverage,
but nobody wins in a strike situation,' says Mr. [Robert Lee] Ballow, who currently
is representing the New York Daily News in negotiations with several of its 10
unions that have been working without a contract since March 30." Id.
204 Samborn, supra note 4, at 28.
Companies are recognizing that an international economy, coupled
with the deregulation of many domestic industries, requires being
competitive, particularly in labor costs.... The historical union response to almost any management request for a concession remains
the threat of a strike. However, strikes which unions have used successfully for decades, are losing the potency that they once enjoyed.
Shutting down a company, much less whole industries, is now almost
impossible.
Id.
205 Weglarz, Unions Adopt New Strategies to Bolster BargainingClout, SAN DIEGO Bus.
J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 18.
2oM Id.
207 Id.
2-8 Id. One example is the union's strategy at Hartson Medical Services. They
planned a strike, but to keep the ambulances running for the community agreed
to offer city residents ambulance services on a voluntary basis. Hartson would
lose money because the union would not work for them directly, but the city
would not lose ambulance services. The union did not have to carry out its plan.
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cotts, work-by-the rule concepts 20 9 corporate buyout
plans, 10 and the corporate campaign 21 ' are among the
new techniques unions endorse since strikes are now effectively impotent.
Unions' continued effectiveness may depend upon deemphasis of the strike and increased reliance upon these
alternate methods. The strike has always been the powerhouse in labor's arsenal, but now some labor leaders see it
as "suicide. ' 21 2 Several factors influence the new attitude,
including: an increasingly global market where companies
export jobs to countries with cheap labor; and, a hostile,
anti-labor political climate which surfaced in the 1980's
under Reagan and which continues today as evidenced by
conservative appointments to the NLRB and federal
courts.2 1 Robert Turcotte of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers states that labor "[has] nothing to bargain with now. Labor has an
empty gun. ' 21 4 It also seems that for "more and more
workers, the time-honored concept of labor unity means
2 15
sharing that pain without the gains.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If the strikes at Greyhound, Eastern Airlines, and the
Daily News are any indication, resolution of the permanent replacement workers debate is imperative. The fight
is impassioned on both sides with both labor and industry
presenting valid points for consideration. Several commentators have proposed solutions and compromises
20 Id. A work-by-the-rule plan instructs workers to only do tasks specifically
required in their job descriptions. Id.
210 Id. Some unions buy shares to exercise influence in the company. Id.
211 Castro, supra note 25, at 57. The corporate campaign entails bringing pressure on customers, outside corporate directors and political leaders. One exam-

ple is at Midland Steel Products in Cleveland, Ohio where replaced United Auto
workers members are visiting customers like General Motors and Navistar to ar-

gue that Midland Steel's quality has deteriorated since they were replaced. Id.
212 Id. at 56.
213 Weglarz, supra note 202, at 18.
214 Castro, supra note 25, at 56.
215 Id. at 59.
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which attempt to ensure involved parties are treated equitably. What is important to bear in mind is labor's goal
from the outset: fair representation and the right to organize without fear of reprisal.
Unfortunately for labor, the business atmosphere in
this country has changed dramatically during the past
half-century. The American economy is driven by the service, rather than the manufacturing industry; global competition is entrenched; and, it is extremely difficult to
incapacitate a given American industry by striking. Realizing this, labor is decreasing its reliance on the strike, instead using unorthodox tactics in an attempt to stimulate
sagging union membership, 2 6 and trying novel ways to
put economic pressure on employers. 1 7
The MacKay doctrine is unlikely to be overturned. It
has survived fifty years of "Congresses [which] have repeatedly turned back efforts to overthrow" it.2 8 A compromise, therefore, seems to be the best answer. A
promising solution exists in H.R. 2620, sponsored by
Rep. William F. Goodling (R-Pa.). H.R. 2620 proposes
allowing the use of permanent replacements only after a
certain amount of time passes after a strike begins. 1 9
This solution addresses the concerns of both labor and
industry. Unfortunately, the House Education and Labor
Committee rejected an almost identical version of H.R.
210 Sheets, Labor's Agendafor the '90's, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 1990,
at 37. "Hoping to reverse the trend [of declining membership], unions have be-

gun to offer prospective members a variety of consumer services ranging from
low-cost credit cards and life insurance to mail-order prescription plans." Id.
217 See supra note 202-208 and accompanying text for a further discussion.
218 Seligman, supra note 143, at 112.
219 Goodling Introduces Substitute to Striker Replacement Legislation, Daily Labor Rep.
(BNA) No. 115, at A-3 (June 14, 1991). The bill prohibits the recruiting and hir-

ing of permanent replacements for the first eight weeks of a strike. H.R. 2620
further requires bargaining unit approval in a secret ballot for strikes by a majority. Finally, the bill amends the Taft-Hartley Act by extending the time from 12 to
18 months in which strikers are eligible to vote in representation elections after a
strike begins and by calling for the National Labor Relations Board to reduce
delays in case processing after a strike. Id.
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2620 when it approved H.R. 5 in April 1991.220 The
Goodling proposal, however, deserves attention.
The bill provides labor with sufficient bargaining power
to make a strike worth risks involved. For a period of
time, labor would have free reign to set forth their demands with no threat of losing their jobs. A solution of
this sort might actually shorten strikes. If both sides realize use of permanent replacements is on the horizon, mitigation of the strike would be expeditiously pursued.
Labor should be motivated to settle before job loss becomes a serious threat and business should want to settle
before they are forced to hire and train replacements,
thereby incurring heavy economic costs and jeopardizing
future relations with their bargaining unit.
The Goodling legislation would also benefit business
because it protects the enterprise from being destroyed,
which could result if hiring replacements per se was outlawed. Furthermore, nothing in the bill forbids the use of
temporary or managerial personnel replacements to continue operations, another strength for the employer without a concurrent drain on labor's power.2 2 ' The employer
would incur less outrage among its union members if they
knew the employer will bargain in good faith and will not
attempt to replace them.
Furthermore, the Goodling legislation addresses industry's fear of giving labor the upper hand by permitting use
of permanent replacements if and when all compromise
efforts fail. The labor union is similarly under duress to
bargain. The union members may even be under more
pressure to bargain knowing that stonewalling on their
part only brings them closer to being permanently replaced. Thus, this legislation serves to better facilitate the
bargaining relationship without diminishing either party's
power.
Labor must understand that its ability to stay in power
220 Id. Goodling will likely introduce H.R. 2620 as a substitute for H.R. 5 on the
House floor if the Rules Committee allows amendments. Id.
221

Id.
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and influence industry will depend on a shift in attitude.
Long gone are the days when labor could expect to have
industry give in to the majority of its demands. Most
likely, the union can continue to be a viable organization
as the year 2000 draws closer; the question remains, however, in what form will the union survive. Workers will
always need a voice to protect themselves and improve
their working conditions. At this juncture, however,
American labor must understand that its glory days are
quickly diminishing. Its impact may be limited since the
market has become globalized, competition brutal, and
traditional labor dispute tools are beginning to backfire
on the workers they were designed to protect.
Both manufacturing and service industries, on the other
hand, need to rethink how they treat their employees as
the turn of the century draws near. Business leaders
should consider the disastrous effects that the use of replacement workers has on employees' lives and morale.
Employers should contemplate the importance of the
human factor in their workforce. Replacing loyal, longterm employees who strike is a drastic solution to a temporary problem. The amount of time and money spent
training employees and instilling company loyalty are
considerations to ponder before replacing them with
newcomers.
MacKay will probably not be overturned. Besides, it is
questionable whether overruling MacKay is the best available alternative. Other solutions exist, however, and it is
up to the creativity and wisdom of Congress to implement
a compromise package that accomplishes the NLRA goal:
place the power equally in the hands of labor and industry
and allow for the speedy and fair resolution of labor
disputes.

